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1015 
THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN NON-CLASS 
SETTLEMENTS 
HOWARD M. ERICHSON

 
What is the role of the judge in aggregate litigation? That was the 
question posed to Judge Alvin Hellerstein and several panelists, including 
myself, at the 2012 Symposium of the Institute of Law and Economic 
Policy. Judge Hellerstein, who has overseen the litigation arising out of 
both the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent rescue efforts 
and clean-up, framed the question more provocatively and purposively: 
“How do you bring justice to ten thousand cases?”1 
The justice that Judge Hellerstein brought to ten thousand cases in the 
September 11 clean-up litigation took the form of a massive settlement.
2
 
Responders who participated in recovery and debris-removal efforts and 
who suffered respiratory diseases and other ailments had sued New York 
City and other defendants, claiming that the city had failed to provide 
adequate protective gear and supervision. Rather than a class action, this 
was a mass non-class aggregate settlement. Plaintiffs’ liaison counsel 
negotiated the deal with New York City after several individual cases had 
been scheduled for trial but before any case had been tried. The resolution 
was accomplished on a non-class basis because the court had earlier 
denied class certification on the grounds that the claims were too 
individualized for class action treatment.
3
 In the denial of class 
certification and the subsequent accomplishment of a mass non-class 
settlement, the outcome was typical of the past decade’s major mass tort 
resolutions.
4
  
 
 
  Professor, Fordham University School of Law. The ideas in this commentary were presented 
at the 2012 symposium of the Institute for Law and Economic Policy in response to Judge Alvin 
Hellerstein’s account of his management of the September 11 clean-up litigation. The author thanks 
the Institute and Washington University School of Law for sponsoring the symposium, and thanks 
Judge Hellerstein and co-panelists Tobias Wolff and Donald Migliori for their provocative ideas. 
 1. Alvin Hellerstein, Presentation at Institute for Law and Economic Policy Symposium, Bahia 
Beach, PR (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 2. See Mireya Navarro, Sept. 11 Workers Agree to Settle Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/20/nyregion/20zero.html?_r=0 (reporting that the 95 
percent participation threshold had been met for a settlement between $625 million and $712.5 million 
to resolve over 10,000 claims). 
 3. In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing Transcript of Status Conference at 31–34 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004)). 
 4. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. La. 2009) 
(discussing settlement of approximately 50,000 individual claims); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
649 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing 2005 settlement of about 8,000 individual claims, 
and noting that “[t]he settlement resolved virtually all cases then pending in the MDL, along with 
Wash U Law Repository
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But the signal moment of the September 11 clean-up litigation was not 
typical at all. In March 2010, Judge Hellerstein “rejected” a settlement that 
the attorneys had negotiated.
5
 He sent the parties back to the bargaining 
table to make the settlement richer. Sure enough, several months later the 
lawyers returned with a settlement proposal that increased plaintiffs’ 
compensation, and this time the judge “approved” it.6 To many observers, 
there may be something quite appealing about the court’s intervention. 
The judge helped World Trade Center responders and clean-up workers 
obtain greater compensation, and the defendant was willing to pay the 
higher amount rather than go to trial.  
What I wonder is where the judge got the power to “approve” or 
“reject” the settlement. I understand, of course, why a judge might wish he 
had that power. Overseeing a case gives a judge a strong investment in the 
outcome as well as a sense of what outcome might be just. But settlement 
is not adjudication.
7
 A settlement is a contract in which a claimant agrees 
to release a claim in exchange for something offered by the defendant.
8
 
There are special circumstances that require judicial approval of 
negotiated resolutions; these circumstances turn settlements into 
something akin to adjudication.
9
 But the September 11 clean-up litigation 
deal was not a class action settlement. It was not a consent judgment in 
which the parties sought the court’s ongoing supervision. It was not a 
settlement by minors or others legally incompetent to make their own 
decisions. Nor was it a shareholder derivative action or an action in which 
a receiver had been appointed. Rather, it was a settlement of individual 
claims, albeit in the context of a complex mass dispute.  
Judge Hellerstein and his special masters—Professors James 
Henderson and Aaron Twerski—have described in a detailed law review 
article the challenges they faced in bringing ten thousand claims to 
 
 
some state cases”). For a notable exception, see In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in 
the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2012 WL 6652608 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2012) (certifying a 
settlement class action to resolve BP’s liability for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill). 
 5. See Mireya Navarro, Federal Judge Orders More Talks on 9/11 Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2010. 
 6. See Mireya Navarro, U.S. District Court Approves Ground Zero Health Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2010, at A28. 
 7. On the increasingly blurry line between adjudication and settlement, see Howard M. 
Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 
1123–27 (2009). 
 8. It bears emphasizing not only that settlement decisions belong to parties rather than the court, 
but also that the settlement decision belongs to the clients, not their lawyers. See, e.g., MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), R. 1.8(g).  
 9. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.14 (2004) (discussing various 
contexts requiring judicial settlement approval). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/11
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resolution.
10
 Their reflections provide an apt occasion for considering the 
role of the judge in bringing a mass dispute to a negotiated resolution. 
I. JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT TO FACILITATE SETTLEMENT 
The judge and special masters took several important steps that set the 
stage for settlement, and these steps nicely illustrate the ways in which 
effective judicial management of complex litigation can pave the way to a 
negotiated resolution.
11
 Relatively early in the proceedings, the judge and 
special masters instituted a phased discovery process with a “core 
discovery order” requiring plaintiffs and defendants to provide certain 
essential information.
12
 The order required each plaintiff to answer 
questions regarding, among other things, “where and when the plaintiff 
worked . . . [on] debris removal,” “the availability of . . . protective 
equipment,” and the plaintiff’s injuries, and it required each plaintiff to 
provide medical records.
13
 Information from these responses, as well as 
information from the defendants, was entered into a database that the court 
ordered the parties to establish.
14
 The core discovery and resulting 
database, by providing essential information about each claimant, by 
allowing an overview of the litigation, and by making it possible to sort 
cases by severity, undoubtedly facilitated the settlement process. 
Not only did the court require the parties to provide information that 
would be useful for either adjudication or settlement, the court also 
proceeded to schedule a number of individual bellwether trials. Bellwether 
trials are a well-established and sound approach to encouraging settlement 
in mass tort litigation. The idea is not that the verdicts in the early trials 
will bind other litigants through extrapolation or issue preclusion,
15
 but 
rather that those verdicts will provide data points that can assist parties in 
 
 
 10. See Alvin K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Managerial 
Judging: The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012); see also Alvin K. 
Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The 9/11 Litigation Database, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 653 (2013). 
 11. As they put it in their article, “it is possible to identify important steps along the way that 
moved the parties from what appeared to be a stalemate in December, 2007 to the presentation to the 
court of a settlement agreement in early March, 2010.” Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging, supra 
note 10, at 142. 
 12. Id. at 142–44 (citing Clarifying Order Regulating Discovery at 2–4, In re World Trade 
Center Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 146–48 (citing Order Regarding Database Objections, In re World Trade Center 
Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2009)). 
 15. For a case in which the district court tried sample claims for extrapolation to other claimants 
but was reversed on appeal, see Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
Wash U Law Repository
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determining settlement values for purposes of negotiating a 
comprehensive deal.
16
 
In their article, the judge and special masters explain in detail the 
process they employed for selecting cases for trial.
17
 Their goal apparently 
was to select a sample of relatively severe cases, combining some desire 
for representativeness with a worst-should-go-first prioritization 
approach.
18
 To the extent they were striving for representativeness, their 
detailed process of case selection may have been more involved than 
necessary. Unlike extrapolation plans, where an enormous amount rides on 
the selection of sample plaintiffs,
19
 informal bellwethers provide useful 
information even if the cases are not perfectly representative or neatly 
selected. Lawyers evaluate bellwether verdicts in light of the particular 
features of the case—the judge, the jury, the lawyers, the strength of the 
plaintiff’s causation case, the severity of the harm, and so on. Judges have 
used a wide variety of techniques to select cases for early trials, including 
literally picking cases from a hat.
20
 In mass tort litigation, cases may arrive 
at trial without an overarching design simply because cases proceed in 
multiple jurisdictions. In the Vioxx pharmaceutical litigation, for example, 
 
 
 16. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 575 (2012) 
(“Because the Supreme Court’s case law has limited litigants’ ability to use the class action device to 
resolve mass torts on an aggregate basis as a formal matter, district courts are using informal 
procedures to facilitate settlements of mass tort cases. These innovative procedures include 
informational bellwether trials, a distant cousin of statistical sampling or Trial by Formula.”). 
 17. They divided the plaintiffs into five groups of two thousand. From each group, the special 
masters were to select two hundred particularly severe cases, plus twenty-five others. From each batch 
of two hundred selected severe cases, the plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and the city each would choose 
two for trial, plus the court would choose two either from the two hundred or from the additional 
twenty-five. Hellerstein, Henderson, & Twerski, Managerial Judging, supra note 10, at 148–52; see 
also In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 503–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(Opinion Discussing Methodology for Discovery and Trials of Sample Cases).  
 18. See In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(Opinion Discussing Methodology for Discovery and Trials of Sample Cases) (“[S]ince the claims of 
those most gravely injured commend themselves to highest priority, the plan provides a procedure to 
identify these cases, a methodology to select a representative sample for full discovery and early trial, 
and a firm and intensive schedule to begin trials.”); see also Hellerstein, Henderson & Twerski, 
Managerial Judging, supra note 10, at 174 (“With such a database, the court could select bellwether 
claims, not blindly or as one or another counsel conceived, but according to criteria that focused on 
merits and severity of injury, for those were the claims that most merited resolution and that would 
most likely affect similarly situated claims.”). Cf. Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: 
Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1992) (recommending 
that courts prioritize trials involving asbestos claimants with serious injuries, and that they defer trials 
of unimpaired asbestos claimants). 
 19. See Lahav, supra note 16, at 612–18. 
 20. In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-CV-1507-WRW (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2005) 
(Order re: Bellwether Trial Selection ) (ordering that fifteen cases be randomly drawn from a pool of 
potential trial cases that meet certain criteria). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/11
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the federal judge overseeing the multidistrict litigation could control only 
part of the early trial schedule because many of the cases were in state 
courts. Despite this confounding aspect to the selection of cases for trial, 
the early Vioxx trials generated information that the parties needed in order 
to negotiate a comprehensive settlement.
21
 The September 11 litigation 
was confined to a single court because Congress legislated that cases must 
be brought in the Southern District of New York.
22
 Exclusive jurisdiction 
gave Judge Hellerstein a level of control over bellwether trial selection 
that other litigation cannot—and need not—match.23 In any event, actual 
bellwether verdicts did not prove necessary to bring the parties to 
settlement in the September 11 litigation; it sufficed that the trials were 
scheduled.
24
  
The important point is that judges can facilitate settlement in mass 
disputes by managing the litigation to bring key information to the surface. 
Discovery and trials, sensibly sequenced, provide information about 
claimants and claim values. Judges facilitate settlement by scheduling 
trials so that parties feel pressure to take negotiations seriously.
25
 And 
bellwether trials in mass litigation provide data points that can move the 
parties toward mass resolution.  
 
 
 21. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 265, 278 (2011). 
 22. Air Transportation Safety & System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(3) (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. § 40101) (“The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York shall have 
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss 
of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes 
of September 11, 2001.”). 
 23. For a discussion of various approaches to selection of cases for bellwether trials, see Eldon E. 
Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2342–65 (2008). 
 24. See Hellerstein, Henderson, & Twerski, Managerial Judging, supra note 10, at 156–57. 
 25. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.13 (2004) (“Setting a firm trial date 
is generally the most effective means to motivate parties to settle.”). See also Hellerstein, Henderson & 
Twerski, Managerial Judging, supra note 10, at 156 (“[T]he sequencing of the litigation created 
uncertainties that made settlement attractive to both sides. For example, with regard to plaintiffs who 
suffered relatively severe respiratory injuries, defendants were reluctant to face the very real 
possibility that juries in the first claims reaching trial might return high verdicts that would make it 
more costly to settle the rest of the claims.”). Although the conventional wisdom is that early trial 
dates push parties to settle, there is an interesting contrary argument that delays may facilitate 
settlement by giving plaintiffs time to adapt to injuries. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & 
Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1516 (2008). 
Wash U Law Repository
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II. JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER SETTLEMENT 
We turn now from facilitation to control. In terms of constraints on 
judicial authority, there is an enormous difference between judicial 
management to facilitate settlement and judicial control over settlement 
terms. 
In March 2010, the city and plaintiffs’ liaison counsel announced that 
they had reached agreement on a settlement with a total amount of $575 
million to $657.5 million. The deal was contingent upon acceptance by at 
least ninety-five percent of the claimants; the total amount depended on 
the acceptance rate, with a premium for high participation. When the 
attorneys informed Judge Hellerstein of the settlement, he rejected it as 
inadequate.
26
 The parties renegotiated and returned with a settlement that 
totaled between $625 million and $712.5 million, with a smaller portion 
allocated for attorneys’ fees, and with ninety-five percent of the funds 
allocated to those with the most severe injuries.
27
 This time the judge 
granted his approval. As Judge Hellerstein explains, “The parties re-
negotiated and returned with a more attractive package—fair in my mind, 
although not perfect—and I approved it.”28 
The question is whether the judge acted properly in rejecting and in 
approving the settlement. When I ask whether the judge acted properly, I 
do not mean whether the initial settlement was inadequate or whether the 
revised settlement was adequate. Rather, I mean whether the judge had 
any authority to impose his own view concerning the adequacy of the 
settlement. 
Others have made the case that judges lack the authority to approve or 
reject settlements in non-class mass litigation. Jeremy Grabill offers a 
thorough analysis of what he calls the “emerging opt-in paradigm for mass 
 
 
 26. Hellerstein, Henderson & Twerski, Managerial Judging, supra note 10, at 157 (“On March 
19, 2010, Judge Hellerstein threw a bombshell into the proceedings by rejecting the settlement as 
inadequate.”) (citing Transcript of Status Conference at 54, In re World Trade Center Disaster Site 
Litig., No. 21 MC 100(AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010)).  
 27. Id. at 160 n.233, 176. 
 28. Id. In another article, Judge Hellerstein states that he understood that there were questions 
about his authority, but he nonetheless reviewed the settlement and approved it only after the total 
amount was increased and the attorneys lowered their fees: “I declined to approve the settlement, 
rejecting objections that I lacked authority to review settlements agreed to by counsel in individual 
lawsuits. Ultimately, the settlement amounts were increased, the fees were lowered, and the procedures 
were modified. I then gave my approval.” Alvin K. Hellerstein, Democratization of Mass Tort 
Litigation: Presiding over Mass Tort Litigation to Enhance Participation and Control by the People 
Whose Claims Are Being Asserted, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 473, 476 (2012). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/11
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tort settlements in the post-class action era.”29 Grabill concludes that 
“there is no need or justification for judicial review of private mass tort 
settlements because such settlements only bind those plaintiffs who 
affirmatively opt in to them.”30 He emphasizes that his argument against 
judicial review does not depend upon whether “mass tort litigation in the 
post-class action era can be generically described as exhibiting ‘quasi-
class action’ or ‘quasi-public’ components.”31 A note by Alexandra 
Rothman examines judicial involvement in four mass tort settlements—
Zyprexa, Vioxx, Guidant, and September 11—and similarly concludes that 
the practice of judicial approval of non-class settlements is unwarranted, 
as it “removes claimant autonomy and damages the adversarial system.”32 
In their article, Hellerstein, Henderson and Twerski do not directly 
address these arguments, but they defend Judge Hellerstein’s decision to 
reject the settlement and they invite a more thorough analysis of this 
question by procedural policy-makers.
33
 Judge Hellerstein explains his 
understanding of the task he faced: 
Incident to the court’s obligation to exercise judicial management to 
supervise the litigation for fairness and efficiency, I saw my task as 
twofold: First, I had to determine whether the proposed settlement 
was fair to the plaintiffs, substantively and procedurally. And 
second, I had to make sure that adequate mechanisms were in place 
to allow all plaintiffs to receive adequate information upon which to 
base their decisions regarding whether to join the settlement. 
Regarding the first issue, after review, I disapproved the proposed 
settlement plan because, considering the amount of reserves that the 
Captive intended to keep for future claims and the percentages 
 
 
 29. Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 123, 182 (2012). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” 
and “Rejection” out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 353 (2011). 
 33. Judge Hellerstein puts it this way: 
On the one hand, if I was right in asserting supervisory control of the litigation and rejecting 
the initial settlement, then those powers should be clearly set forth so that the next judge who 
faces these issues does not feel overly constrained for fear of appellate reversal. On the other 
hand, if I was wrong, then an explicit rule should define the proper constraints. In any event, 
if this article contributes to a more thorough, informed analysis by those charged with 
formulating policy and articulating a rule (one way or another), our efforts in writing it will 
have been rewarded. 
Hellerstein, Henderson & Twerski, Managerial Judging, supra note 10, at 177 (citations omitted). 
Wash U Law Repository
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going to the lawyers, too little would end up being paid to the 
plaintiffs.
34
 
In the judge’s two-part description of his task, the second part—ensuring 
that plaintiffs have sufficient information about the proposed settlement—
is unassailable. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the matter in that it 
recognizes that settlement decisions belong to the parties. The problem is 
the first part. When the judge states that he “had to determine whether the 
proposed settlement was fair to the plaintiffs, substantively and 
procedurally,” we should ask why he had to do this. When called upon to 
adjudicate, a judge faces the job of applying law to facts with appropriate 
considerations of substantive and procedural fairness. But in a negotiated 
resolution, when the parties can decide for themselves whether to release 
claims in exchange for offered compensation, is it really the case that the 
judge “had to determine whether the proposed settlement was fair”? What 
gives the judge the job of telling parties the terms on which they may 
choose to release their claims? 
If the litigation had been a class action, we would not ask this question. 
Had it been a class action, a settlement would have bound persons who did 
not affirmatively choose to participate. Because class settlements are not 
founded on agreement of all the participants, a class action settlement 
takes effect only as a form of adjudication and therefore requires the 
judge’s decision to put the power of the court behind the resolution. This 
decision takes the form of a judicial determination that the settlement is 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.”35 The court in the September 11 
litigation, however, denied class certification: 
I denied class status because of the variety of illnesses alleged by 
the plaintiffs, the varying severity of their illnesses, the transient 
nature of the worksites, the varying levels of supervision governing 
plaintiffs’ work, the variety of defendants, and the complexity of 
determining and evaluating pre-existing medical conditions.
36
 
In nonetheless treating the matter as if it were a class action for purposes 
of judicial settlement review, the court picked up on the “quasi-class 
action” notion introduced by Judge Jack Weinstein in the Zyprexa 
pharmaceutical product liability litigation.
37
 In the Zyprexa case, Judge 
 
 
 34. Id. at 175 (citations omitted). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 36. In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing Transcript of Status Conference at 31–34 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004)). 
 37. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss3/11
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Weinstein “approved” the settlement38 and imposed caps on fees, 
explaining that the court’s involvement was needed because of the strong 
resemblance between mass non-class litigation and class actions: 
While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private 
agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has 
many of the characteristics of a class action; it may be characterized 
properly as a quasi-class action subject to the general equitable 
power of the court. The large number of plaintiffs subject to the 
same settlement matrix approved by the court, the utilization of 
special masters appointed by the court to control discovery and to 
assist in reaching and administering a settlement, the court’s order 
approving and controlling a huge escrow fund, [and] other 
interventions by the court in controlling discovery for all claimants 
. . . reflect a degree of court control that supports the imposition of 
fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel 
regarding issues such as settlement procedures.
39
 
Other judges followed in Judge Weinstein’s footsteps, offering their 
approval of mass settlements and explaining their involvement on a quasi-
class action theory. In the Vioxx litigation, Judges Eldon Fallon, Carol 
Higbee and Victoria Chaney expressed approval of a multi-billion dollar 
settlement to resolve tens of thousands of product liability claims.
40
 In the 
Guidant defibrillator litigation, Judge Donovan Frank approved a 
settlement and recommended it to all of the claimants.
41
  
What got people’s attention about Judge Hellerstein’s involvement was 
that, unlike the others, his review resulted in a rejection. A judge’s 
approval does not trouble the primary players; they are pleased. But when 
 
 
 38. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596 (JBW), 2005 WL 3117302 (E.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 22, 2005). 
 39. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (citations omitted). 
 40. Transcipt of Proceedings at 31, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. 
Nov. 9, 2007) (Judge Higbee calling the settlement “a very fair resolution”); id. at 38 (Judge Chaney 
calling it “a fair and reasonable resolution”); Transcript of Status Conference at 13, In re Vioxx Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657-L (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2008) (Judge Fallon stating that the settlement 
program “will be in the best interests of all concerned”). The master settlement agreement noted that 
Judge Fallon agreed to serve as Chief Administrator of the settlement. Settlement Agreement between 
Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto, § 6.1.1 (Nov. 9, 2007), 
available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement 
%20-%20new.pdf (“At the request of the Parties, The Honorable Eldon E. Fallon has agreed to preside 
over the Program in the capacities specified herein. For convenience, Judge Fallon will be referred to 
herein as the ‘Chief Administrator’.”). 
 41. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., Transcript (D. Minn. Dec. 
17, 2007). 
Wash U Law Repository
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a judge rejects a deal that the primary players have negotiated, it is no 
surprise that the players complain. Thus, Judge Hellerstein’s rejection 
gave rise to attacks and defenses. It would be a mistake, however, to focus 
too much on the difference between approval and rejection. The question 
is simply whether a judge has the authority to review a non-class 
settlement. If the judge lacks authority to reject the settlement, then 
“approval” is empty. If the judge lacks the authority to reject a settlement, 
the judge’s “rejection” or “approval” is nothing more than the judge’s 
opinion and should not be offered with any air of control. 
Indeed, unauthorized judicial approval may cause just as much 
mischief as unauthorized judicial rejection. When a judge purports to 
reject a settlement that would have been acceptable to the parties, the 
judge deprives the parties of control over their claims. The parties have no 
guarantee that they will be able to renegotiate the settlement in a way that 
meets with the judge’s approval, and therefore the judge creates a risk of 
depriving the parties of a negotiated resolution. The mischief potentially 
created by unauthorized judicial approval is of a different sort. Lawyers 
who negotiate mass settlements want the judge’s blessing. To them, 
judicial approval offers a kind of inoculation against charges that they 
handled the matter improperly. Mass settlements present difficult ethical 
obligations for lawyers, and disputes over mass settlements are not 
uncommon.
42
 If a judge’s blessing takes pressure off of attorneys to 
comply fully with their obligations, then it does a disservice. The 
counterargument is that judicial review enhances the likelihood that 
lawyers will take their obligations seriously. Judges, however, have an 
interest in achieving comprehensive settlements. In this regard, a judge 
overseeing mass litigation has interests that align with the defendant as 
well as with plaintiffs’ counsel, but that may run counter to the interests of 
claimants. Because of this, there is some risk that judicial approval may 
provide cover for attorneys without providing meaningful protection for 
parties. 
More fundamentally, it is a question of power. Claims belong to 
claimants, not to the judge. If a claimant chooses to dismiss her claim in 
exchange for compensation offered by the defendant, that is the claimant’s 
prerogative.
43
 True, by filing a complaint, a plaintiff subjects herself to the 
 
 
 42. For a discussion of some of these disputes, see Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-
or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010). 
 43. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a) (discussing a plaintiff’s ability to voluntarily dismiss a claim), 
with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (class action may not be dismissed or compromised without judicial 
approval). 
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power of the court to adjudicate the claim. But adjudication and settlement 
flow from different power sources. The judge functions both as a potential 
adjudicator and as a manager of a process that may lead to a negotiated 
resolution, but that does not mean that the judge exercises the same power 
in each of these roles.  
CONCLUSION 
We began with Judge Hellerstein’s question: How do you bring justice 
to ten thousand cases? The judge who tries to answer this question, I have 
tried to suggest, must keep two important distinctions in mind: the line 
between class and non-class litigation, and the line between adjudication 
and settlement. In a class action, the judge not only runs the adjudicatory 
process but also must decide whether to approve any proposed settlement. 
But if the court does not certify the class, as in the September 11 clean-up 
litigation, then the court’s role vis-à-vis settlement is limited to facilitation 
rather than outcome control.  
The judge may facilitate settlement not only through explicit 
encouragement and dispute resolution techniques, but also by moving the 
litigation forward in ways that yield information the parties need. In 
particular, the judge may manage discovery to bring out essential 
information that the parties need in order to reach decisions about claim 
values. The judge also may facilitate settlement by scheduling bellwether 
trials that provide data points regarding outcomes and values. Unlike the 
judge overseeing a class action, however, the judge overseeing non-class 
litigation has no general power to accept or reject a settlement. 
Constraints on judicial power concern more than the case at hand. 
Whenever a judge purports to exercise power that does not belong to the 
court, even if we are confident that the judge did not abuse the power, we 
do not know what the next judge will do. Will the next judge “reject” a 
fair settlement, depriving the parties of a resolution that would have 
satisfied them? Will the next judge “approve” an unfair settlement, 
providing unwarranted encouragement for claimants and undeserved 
insulation for lawyers? It is no answer to say that bad decisions can occur 
in both adjudication and settlement. Judges are well situated to adjudicate; 
they are not equally well situated to decide for individuals whether those 
individuals should be willing to release their claims in exchange for an 
offered compromise. On the question of whether justice was done in the 
September 11 clean-up litigation—that is, whether the settlement amount 
and distribution sufficed in light of the strength of the claims—I have no 
sound basis for an opinion. But on the question of whether the decision to 
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settle belonged to the litigants rather than to the judge, the answer is 
straightforward: the decision belonged to the litigants. 
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